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Abstract. We develop a coupled economic-metacommunity model to investigate the trade-off between
diversity and profit for multispecies systems. The model keeps track of the presence or absence of species in
habitat patches. With this approach, it becomes (relatively) simple to include more species than can
typically be included in models that track species population density. We use this patch-occupancy
framework to understand how profit and biodiversity are impacted by (1) community assembly, (2) pricing
structures that value species equally or unequally, and (3) the implementation of marine reserves. We find
that when local communities assemble slowly as a result of facilitative colonization, there are lower profits
and optimal harvest rates, but the trade-off with diversity may be either large or small. The trade-off is
diminished if later colonizing species are more highly valued than early colonizers. When the cost of
harvesting is low, maximizing profits tends to sharply reduce biodiversity and maximizing diversity entails
a large harvesting opportunity cost. In the models we analyze, marine reserves are never economically
optimal for a profit-maximizing owner. However, management using marine reserves may provide low-
cost biodiversity protection if the community is over-harvested.
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INTRODUCTION
There is growing evidence that biologically
diverse ecosystems provide services to society
that are more valuable than the sum that would
be provided by isolated individual species
(Boehlert 1996, Worm et al. 2006); that is,
biodiversity has real value (Halpern et al. 2012).
It follows that natural and anthropogenic threats
to biodiversity, including over-harvesting and
habitat destruction, have real biodiversity costs
(Halpern et al. 2008). As a result, and particularly
in marine systems, interest has begun to move
from the management of single species or
populations, and toward ‘ecosystem-based man-
agement’ in which the conservation of biodiver-
sity is typically one of the explicit goals (Kellner
et al. 2011).
Of course, the conservation of biodiversity will
have costs. In harvested systems, maximizing
biodiversity may come at the cost of reduced
economic productivity or employment (Cheung
and Sumaila 2008). In order for managers and
policy makers to strike a reasoned balance
between economic productivity and biodiversity
conservation they must be able to estimate those
costs, typically with the aid of mathematical
models.
Although bioeconomic modeling studies have
considered the management of several interact-
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ing species (e.g., Finnoff and Tschirhart 2003,
Fleming and Alexander 2003, Kellner et al. 2011),
these are typically limited in the number of
species that they consider. A model complex
enough to capture all of the interactions both
within and between its biological and economic
components, for realistically large communities,
is difficult to construct and often needs an
prodigious amount of environmental, biological,
and economic data in order to estimate its
parameters (Fulton et al. 2011, Fogarty 2014). In
most cases, such data is simply not available. In
addition, ecosystem-based management is
‘‘place-based’’ (McLeod et al. 2005, Crowder
and Norse 2008) and so requires models with a
spatial component. Spatial management has
become an ubiquitous part of the marine
conservation toolbox (Neubert and Herrera
2008, Botsford et al. 2009, Rassweiler et al.
2012) and, in a variety of conditions, has been
shown to improve management outcomes (e.g.,
Thrush et al. 1998, Sanchirico and Wilen 1999,
Neubert 2003, Kellner et al. 2007, Neubert and
Herrera 2008, Moeller and Neubert 2013). Marine
reserves—spatial management in which some
areas are closed to fishing—have garnered
interest as a way to potentially increase biodi-
versity, population sizes, resilience of communi-
ties to perturbations (including climate change),
and spillover of biomass into fishable areas.
How, then, could one include multiple species
in a mathematically-tractable bioeconomic frame-
work that is complex enough to address ques-
tions of spatial management? Here we present
one possibility, and demonstrate how it could be
used to understand the trade-offs (or synergies)
between biodiversity conservation and economic
productivity. Our approach has, at its founda-
tion, a so-called patch-occupancy model (e.g.,
Levins and Culver 1971, Hastings 1980, Caswell
and Cohen 1991, Leibold et al. 2004). Such
models have been used to investigate how
species-specific differences in dispersal and col-
onization ability affect local and regional diver-
sity patterns (Levins and Culver 1971, Gouhier et
al. 2011), as well as the role of disturbance in
maintaining or eroding biodiversity (Nee and
May 1992, Prakash and de Roos 2004).
Here we develop a patch-occupancy metacom-
munity framework in order to understand how
profit and biodiversity are impacted by (1) the
process of community assembly, (2) pricing
structures that treat species harvest values either
equally or unequally, and (3) the implementation
of marine reserves.
In general, we are concerned with the trade-off
between diversity and profit over a range of
harvest rates and reserve fractions. The curves in
Fig. 1 are intended to illustrate the different
diversity and profit quantities discussed in the
paper. Two quantities are useful for summarizing
this trade-off: the change in diversity—the
‘diversity gain’—and the change in profit—the
‘foregone profit’—that accompany a change in
harvest rate or reserve fraction relative to their
profit maximizing levels (Fig. 1). These quantities
are useful for comparing the trade-off under
different management scenarios. If no reserves
are implemented, the diversity gain and forgone
profit result solely from a decrease in harvest rate
(Fig. 1a). When reserves are added (as in Fig. 1b),
the changes in diversity and profit can result
from a combination of the effects of the reserve
and harvest rate changes. With reserves, we also
introduce the concept of ‘protected diversity,’
which is the increase in diversity at open access
that results from implementing a reserve. The
shape of these trade-off curves is determined by
the biotic interactions within the community; the
shape shown here was anticipated from biomass
versus profit for single-species models and serves
as a comparison for the shape we may obtain
when plotting diversity versus profit. One
objective of this study is to characterize and
understand how biotic interactions influence the
shape of these trade-off curves. Table 1 details the
relevant quantities that we calculate in our two
illustrative models.
PATCH OCCUPANCY FRAMEWORK
Patch occupancy models have several advan-
tages over alternative approaches. First, by using
spatial models, we can incorporate ecologically
important processes such as dispersal and habitat
disturbance. Second, because they are spatially
implicit, and only consider species’ presence or
absence (rather than population density), patch-
occupancy models tend to be more amenable to
analysis than their spatially explicit counterparts.
Finally, coupling the patch-occupancy model
with a simple economic model enables us to
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optimize profit or diversity and gain insights into
the trade-offs between different management
objectives.
The first step in formulating a patch occupancy
model is to divide a site (e.g., a bay, reef, or
fishing ground) into a set of patches. Each of
these patches is described by its state, as defined
by the identities of the species present. Patches
can change state either because they are colo-
nized by individuals of a new species dispersing
from other patches or by losing species via local
extinction. The dynamics of community assem-
bly are determined by the rules governing the
colonization process—in particular how the state
of a patch determines which species may
invade—and the rules governing species replace-
ment (or coexistence) after a colonization event.
In the following sections, we construct two
illustrative models that capture two extreme
community assembly mechanisms. In the first,
null model, we assume that the species do not
interact and may colonize any habitable patch at
which they are not already present. The simplic-
ity of this model makes it a useful baseline
against which to compare more complicated and
realistic processes. Such models are commonly
used in community assembly studies (e.g.,
Weiher and Keddy 1995, Neubert et al. 2006).
In the facilitation model we assume that species
may only colonize patches already inhabited by a
facilitating species. This type of obligate facilita-
tion operates, for example, when one species
provides habitat for another (e.g., anemones and
clownfish (Dunn 1981), which may be targeted
for aquarium trade, or crabs in mussel beds
(Silliman et al. 2011)); for other examples, see
Bruno et al. (2003). In the facilitative model
section below, we demonstrate the trade-offs that
might be present in these communities. The
facilitation model is simple and readily com-
pared with a null model; in the discussion, we
suggest possible model extensions to incorporate
more complex community assembly dynamics.
In the framework we develop here, local
extinction is the result of harvesting that can be
regulated by a resource manager. Harvest causes
extirpation of all species within a patch and
renders the patch uninhabitable until the patch
habitat recovers. Fishing frequently damages
habitat (for example, through trawling) and has
been shown to have strong effects on community
Fig. 1. Schematic of the quantities related to profit-
diversity trade-offs with (a) effort regulation and (b)
effort regulation plus marine reserves. In each panel,
the grey and black curve represents the profit-diversity
trade-off for a community with no marine reserve. The
orange curve indicates this trade-off for a community
where some habitat is protected by a marine reserve.
The diversity gain (purple, horizontal bar) and forgone
profit (green, vertical bar) are calculated for a
particular harvest rate (star). They are measured
relative to the diversity and profit at the profit
maximizing harvest rate. Descriptions of ‘open access
diversity,’ ‘profit maximizing diversity,’ and ‘protected
diversity’ are provided in the text and Table 1. For each
profit-diversity curve, the lighter portion of the curve
indicates where profit and diversity can be simulta-
neously increased by harvesting less.
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composition (e.g., Thrush et al. 1998, Thrush and
Dayton 2002). In addition, previous studies that
have incorporated destruction of habitat have
found it to be an important driver of interspecies
interactions (Caswell and Cohen 1991, Klausmei-
er 2001, Prakash and de Roos 2004) and optimal
management (Moeller and Neubert 2013). Below
we present a case in which harvesting is the only
source of disturbance in the community; we
discuss the implications of this assumption in the
discussion.
The structure of this model, the simplicity of
which we exploit to facilitate analysis over these
broad ranges of ecological and economic param-
eters and relationships, comes in the form of
strong assumptions. For instance, we assume that
harvesters do not know the state of any
particular patch—including one that they just
harvested. Harvester avoidance of recently fished
areas would increase the effective fishing pres-
sure applied to other areas. The model is also
spatially implicit, which means that the survival
of relict populations in space, as can occur with
cellular automaton models, cannot occur. Our
study of equilibrium conditions also means that
the study of systems that are perturbed or far
from equilibrium are not accommodated. How-
ever, as detailed below, many of these assump-
tions make this framework suitably tractable to
be coupled with a simple economic model in
order to address the role of community assembly,
pricing structure, and profit-diversity trade-offs
under different types of management.
NULL MODEL
In the null model, species do not interact and
are identical in colonizing ability. Species may
colonize any habitable patch at which they are
not already present; the rate of colonization is
independent of the presence or absence of other
species. Some patches are also uninhabitable
until they recover.
Imagine S species which are distributed among
a large set of N patches. A simple way of defining
the state of a particular habitable patch is to label
it with a 13 S vector, w, composed of zeros and
ones. The ith element of w, wi, is one if species i is
present and zero if it is absent. An uninhabitable
patch is in state /. We will keep track of the
number of patches in these states with the
variables Xw and X/. In general, there will be 2
S
þ 1 state variables. Table 2 lists the variable and
parameter names for reference.
It will be notationally convenient to define W
as the set of all possible w, and Wi as the subset of
W whose members have ith element equal to one.
Thus W is the set of all possible habitable states
and Wi is the set of all states where species i is
present (regardless of other inhabitants). It will
also be useful to define the state where only
species i is present as ei.
The state of an individual patch is changed
when it is colonized, harvested, or recovers from
harvest. Patches are harvested at rate h, causing
the patch to become temporarily uninhabitable.
These patches recover at rate r, becoming
habitable, but empty. Thus, the number of
uninhabitable patches changes at the rate
dX/
dt
¼ h
X
w2W
Xw
 !
 rX/: ð1Þ
Next, let us consider the rate of change of the
number of habitable patches that are in state w.
These patches change state when they are
Table 1. Definitions and concepts.
Term Units Definition
Diversity (a) no. spp. average number of species in a patch at equilibrium
Profit (P) $ per time revenue from selling fish minus harvest costs of fish at equilibrium
Profit (p) $ per patch per time revenue from selling fish minus harvest costs of fish at equilibrium, per
patch
Diversity gain no. spp. change in diversity relative to that at profit maximizing harvest level
Forgone profit $ per time change in profit relative to maximum profit
Open access no units unregulated state in which profit is zero
Open access diversity no. spp. diversity at open access harvest level
Profit maximizing
diversity
no. spp. diversity at the profit maximizing harvest level
Protected diversity no. spp. difference between diversity at open access with and without a reserve
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colonized or harvested. In a given patch, coloni-
zation by species i occurs only when species i is
absent; i.e., when wi ¼ 0. Propagules of species i
are produced in state Wi patches. There areP
g2Wi Xg such patches. Because all species are
identical in this null model, these propagules are
generated at constant per-patch rates, c. Each of
these propagules lands on a patch in state w with
probability Xw/N. We now sum over all species to
obtain the rate of colonization of patches in state
w as
XS
i¼1
ð1 wiÞ
Xw
N
c
X
g2Wi
Xg
 !
: ð2Þ
New state-w patches are created by the
colonization of patches that, by the addition of
a single species, become a state-w patch. Let us
focus on one such patch that is missing species i;
it is in state w  ei. At any time, there are
c
P
g2Wi Xg propagules of species i being pro-
duced to colonize our focal patch. Only a fraction
of these propagules, 1/N, will land on it to
possibly recruit. Summing over all species that
are eligible to colonize patches in state w  ei
(those with wi ¼ 1) gives us the total rate of
addition of new state-w patches
XS
i¼1
wi
Xwei
N
c
X
g2Wi
Xg
 !
: ð3Þ
Combining the effects of harvest and coloni-
zation, we obtain
dX0
dt
¼ rX/ 
XS
i¼1
X0
N
c
X
g2Wi
Xg
 !
 hX0 ð4Þ
and
dXw
dt
¼ 
XS
i¼1
ð1 wiÞ
Xw
N
c
X
g2Wi
Xg
 !
þ
XS
i¼1
wi
Xwei
N
c
X
g2Wi
Xg
 !
 hXw ð5Þ
for W 6¼ 0. By defining
x/ ¼ X/=N; and xw ¼ Xw=N ð6Þ
(so that x/ and xw track the fraction of patches in
these states) and rearranging we further simplify
the null model to
dx/
dt
¼ h
X
w2W
xw
 !
 rx/ ð7Þ
dx0
dt
¼ rx/ 
XS
i¼1
x0c
X
g2Wi
xg
 !
 hx0 ð8Þ
dxw
dt
¼ c
XS
i¼1
X
g2Wi
xg½wixwei  ð1 wiÞxw
 !
 hxw:
ð9Þ
Eqs. 7–9 comprise the biological and harvest-
ing component of our null model. A simple
example of this model, with only two species, is
illustrated in Fig. 2; we show the corresponding
equations, for the reader’s entertainment, in
Appendix A.
A manager of such a multispecies fishery
might choose h to maximize profit. The profit
depends on the cost of harvesting, the price for
the harvested fish, and the intra-and interspecific
interactions that determine the dynamics of the
metacommunity. In the section ‘Null model:
diversity and profit,’ we focus on a manager
who wants to understand the potential trade-off
between long-term, sustainable profit (i.e, the
profit at equilibrium) and biodiversity. Before
this, we explore how the equilibrium configura-
tion of the metacommunity depends upon the
control variable h, which we will take to be a
constant. This allows us to formulate relatively
simple static optimization problems and facilitates
Table 2. Null model parameters and variables.
Term Units Definition
r time1 rate of recovery for uninhabitable
patches to become habitable
c time1 rate of propagule production from a
single patch
w $ patch1 cost of effort
e . . . efficiency of harvest
N no. number of patches in the community
S no. spp. number of species in the community
h time1 rate of harvest; this renders the
harvested patch uninhabitable
X/ no. patches number of uninhabitable patches
Xw no. patches number of patches in state w
x/ . . . proportion of patches in the
uninhabitable state
yi . . . proportion of patches with species i
(regardless of other inhabitants)
xf . . . proportion of patches in reserve, with
all S species present
Note: An ellipsis indicates a unitless quantity.
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Fig. 2. (a) Schematic of null model states (boxes) and transitions (arrows; solid lines are colonization, dashed
lines are harvest, labels are rates) for a community with 2 species. The model equations are described in
Appendix A. Uninhabitable patches (gray box) can recover to become habitable (white boxes) at rate r. These
empty patches can then be colonized by either species 1 or 2 (pink and blue boxes) at a rate proportional to the
number of patches producing propagules and the number of patches being colonized. Finally, these patches may
transition to a patch with both species (purple box). All patches may become uninhabitable through harvest. (b)
Schematic of how the transitions in (a) manifest for many patches. The circles represent patches in various states
using the same color scheme as in (a). Each panel corresponds roughly to the time steps marked in (c). Note that
in the last two time steps, an equilibrium has been reached where the overall number of patches in each state is
the same, but the state of individual patches may have changed. (c) Plot showing the simulations of the system of
equations from Appendix A through time. While the proportion of patch states was initialized with an even
distribution, the proportions differ once the equilibrium has been reached.
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identification of profit-diversity trade-offs. An
alternative approach, and an ambitious next step,
might include the consideration of the dynamic
control of harvest in time and the stability of
solutions to imperfect control; the importance of
such analyses in understanding fisheries collapse
is illustrated for a single species by Roughgarden
and Smith (1996).
Null model: equilibria
The dynamics of our null model are dominated
by equilibria. While the state of any particular
patch will continue to change as it is harvested,
recovers, and is colonized, the proportion of
patches in those states converges to a set fraction
determined by the parameter values. Thus, at
any time the patches are in a mosaic with some
patches containing all species, some uninhabit-
able, et cetera. As long as all S species are initially
present in the community, the fraction of patches
in the uninhabitable state will converge to the
equilibrium value x/ , and the fraction of patches
in the various habitable states will converge to
xw. An easy way to calculate the equilibria is to
introduce the new variable yi ¼
P
g2Wi xg which
gives the fraction of all patches that contain
species i. The dynamics of yi are given by
dx/
dt
¼ hð1 x/Þ  rx/; ð10Þ
dyi
dt
¼ cyið1 x/  yiÞ  hyi; for 1  i  S: ð11Þ
We can solve for the proportions of patches in
these states at equilibrium as
x/ ¼
h
r þ h ð12Þ
and
yi ¼ y ¼
r
r þ h
h
c
: ð13Þ
All S species persist as long as the harvest rate
satisfies c  h(rþh)/r. At higher harvest levels, all
species are extirpated and y* ¼ 0. We show that
this solution is stable in Appendix B.
To calculate xw, we take advantage of the
symmetry among species’ equilibrium values and
use the binomial formula. Specifically,
xw ¼
y
1 x/
 !k
1 y

1 x/
 !ðSkÞ
ð1 x/Þ ð14Þ
where k is the number of species present in state
w (i.e., the sum of the elements of w ). The
proportion of patches with exactly i species, zi, is
zi ¼ S!
i!ðS iÞ!
y
1 x/
 !i
1 y

1 x/
 !ðSiÞ
ð1 x/Þ:
ð15Þ
At low harvest rates, most patches have all
species, although there are some patches in every
state (Appendix D: Fig. D1). At sufficiently high
harvest levels, when c , h(rþ h)/r, all species are
extirpated from the system.
Null model: diversity and profit
We use the equilibrium values (Eqs. 14–15) to
calculate diversity and profit. We focus on a
diversity, or the expected number of species at a
patch
a ¼
X
i
izi ¼ Sy: ð16Þ
For the null model, Eqs. 10–11, a diversity
declines monotonically with harvest rate in all
cases (Fig. 3a). Higher colonization rates or
recovery rates increase the diversity at a partic-
ular harvest level. When the diversity curve
intersects the h-axis, all species are extirpated.
To calculate profit, we need to specify the
monetary value of the harvest from a patch in
each state. Because species are identical and do
not interact, each contributes the same amount of
biomass and value to a patch. Without loss of
generality then, we set the value of the harvest
from a patch equal to the number of species that
are present. Any unoccupied (or uninhabitable)
patch is worth 0. We call the price of a patch with
i species present pi; for the null model, pi¼ i.
There is also a cost to harvest. We will assume
the per patch harvest cost is w. The revenue
gained from all inhabited patches, which are
harvested with efficiency e, minus the effort costs
is the equilibrium profit, P
P ¼ eNh
X
i
zipi
 !
 whN: ð17Þ
The per patch profit rate p ¼ P/N gives the
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average profit obtained from harvest of an
individual patch and is obtained by dividing
Eq. 17 by N.
A manager who can regulate the harvest level
is able to maximize the profit rate. Without such
oversight, we will assume the system is at open-
access, i.e., profits are driven to zero (Clark 1973).
Profit is maximized at an intermediate harvest
level, hPM. The open access harvest level, hOA, is
higher (Fig. 3b).
We can now compare the diversity and profit
at different harvest levels or among fisheries with
different biological or economic parameters (Fig.
3c). a diversity is maximized when h¼ 0, thus p¼
0 as well. We focus on the maximal diversity gain
(recall Fig. 1)—the increase in diversity from the
profit maximizing harvest rate relative to the
diversity at no harvest. The monetary cost of
maximizing diversity is the difference in profit at
hPM and at the diversity maximizing level. In the
null model, h ¼ 0 maximizes diversity, so the
‘profit loss’ or cost to maximize diversity is
equivalent to the maximal profit.
As can be seen in Fig. 4, if propagule
production rates, c, are high relative to the
recovery rate, both the profit lost (a) and the
diversity gained (b) by maximizing diversity are
more sensitive to variation in harvest costs, w,
than propagule production rates. Higher propa-
gule production rates and lower effort costs
(northwest in both plots) boost the maximum
profit attainable in a given community, which
incentivizes a heavy harvest and thus reduces
diversity.
However, the trade-off is not always large.
Both low costs or high propagule production
rates can make a community profitable to
harvest; however, they do not impact the trade-
off between diversity and profit in identical
ways. For example, when propagule production
rates are low, the profit loss is very low, whereas
the diversity gain may still be large. When
Fig. 3. For the null model (top row; Eqs. 10 and 11) and facilitation model (bottom row; Eqs. 25–28), a diversity
(a) and profit (b) depend upon the harvest rate. Together these determine the trade-off between profit and
diversity at equilibrium (c). For the parameter values r¼ 1 and c¼ 5 (solid curve), the profit maximizing harvest
rate is marked hPM and the open access harvest rate is marked hOA. The diversity gain (relative to profit
maximizing harvest level) and profit loss (when diversity is maximized) are labelled in (c). For all panels, S¼ 15,
w ¼ 0.5, and e ¼ 1.
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propagule production rates are low, a small
increase in harvest rate increases the proportion
of empty patches dramatically. As a result, even
the small profit-maximizing harvest levels can
cause large diversity losses. A community with
low propagule production rates and high harvest
costs will still face high diversity losses when
harvesting occurs, but the high harvest cost
reduces optimal harvest rates, so this potential
diversity loss is not realized. However, it is
important to note that these results are for a
profit-maximizer; the costs associated with man-
aging an open-access fishery may be very
different.
Null model: spatial management
To investigate the cost of conserving diversity
using marine reserves we modify our models to
keep track of the proportion of patches that
cannot be harvested. Since harvest is the only
source of disturbance, we will assume that
protected patches harbor all species. These
reserves have the potential to provide the
maximum benefit to biodiversity. Let us call the
fixed fraction of patches that are set aside as
protected reserves xf . The dynamics are gov-
erned by the following systems of equations,
which modify Eqs. 10 and 11:
dx/
dt
¼ hð1 x/  xf Þ  rx/ ð18Þ
dyi
dt
¼ cðyi þ xf Þð1 x/  yi  xf Þ  hyi: ð19Þ
The equilibria are then
x/ ¼
hð1 xf Þ
r þ h ð20Þ
yi ¼ y
¼
hþ A cxf þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðh Aþ cxf Þ2 þ 4cxf A
q
2c
ð21Þ
where A¼ c(1x/xf ). This is the equilibrium as
long as y* is positive (otherwise yi ¼ 0).
We calculate a diversity and profit, which are
now
a ¼ Sðyi þ xf Þ ð22Þ
p ¼ eh
X
zipi
 
 wh ð23Þ
where zi is modified from Eq. 15 as
zi ¼ S!
i!ðS iÞ!
y
1 x/  xf
 !i
1 y

1 x/  xf
 !ðSiÞ
3 ð1 x/  xf Þ: ð24Þ
Fig. 4. (a) Potential profit lost from harvesting at the diversity maximizing level (h ¼ 0); i.e., the maximum
profit. For a particular combination of harvest cost (w) and propagule production rate (c), this value is
represented by the vertical profit-loss arrow in Fig. 3c. (b) Diversity gain at no harvest relative to harvesting at the
profit maximizing level (h ¼ hPM). For a particular w and c combination, this value is represented by the
horizontal diversity gain arrow in Fig. 3c. For both panels, S ¼ 15, r ¼ 1 and e ¼ 1.
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We use these to compare the trade-off between
diversity and profit (Fig. 5, left column).
At a particular harvest level, a diversity is
always higher when reserves are present, as a set
of patches with all species present is preserved.
The maximum profit attainable is, however,
lower if reserves are implemented (Fig. 5). Hart
(2006) found a similar pattern in a single-species
model, maximizing yield. The harvest rate that
maximizes profit and the harvest rate at open
access both increase. Consistent with this finding,
Halpern et al. (2004) showed that concentrated
effort outside reserves could not produce com-
parable harvest to a community without re-
serves, unless there is a compensatory increase
to the production rate.
In addition to increased diversity at all harvest
rates, reserves provide an additional benefit: a
diversity buffer. Whatever the harvest rate,
diversity cannot fall below a lower limit (equal
to xf S ). Even when the community is harvested
at extreme (open-access) harvest levels, some
diversity is preserved. We define ‘protected
diversity’ as the difference in diversity in the
community at open-access when no reserve is
present and when it is. At very high harvest
rates, the diversity gain is almost entirely due to
the diversity of patches in the reserve state;
outside the reserves, most patches will be in
uninhabitable states.
We can calculate the forgone profit necessary
to achieve different combinations of the two
types of diversity: protected diversity and the
realized diversity gain. In Fig. 6, we show that
Fig. 5. Fifteen-species versions of the null model (left panels, Eqs. 18–19) and facilitation model (right panels,
Eqs. 25–28) with parameter values c¼ 5, r¼ 1, e¼ 1, and w¼ 0.5. The black, dashed line indicates a community
with 20% in reserve and the solid line indicates a community with no reserves. (top) a diversity as a function of
harvest rate. The open access harvest rates are marked. The vertical arrow shows the ‘protected diversity’, which
is the difference between the diversity at open access with no reserves and at open access with a reserve. (bottom)
Profit as a function of harvest rate. The vertical arrow shows the difference in maximal profit rate without and
with a reserve.
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the cost of adding relatively large amounts of
protected diversity is consistently low (i.e., the
iso-cost curves are approximately flat over large
ranges of protected diversity). The white line
shows the diversity at the profit-maximizing
harvest rate for a given amount of protected
diversity. Above the white line, one can often
gain protected diversity without sacrificing much
profit by increasing the reserve fraction. Below
the white line, for a fixed protected diversity, one
can always increase the diversity gain and profit
by decreasing the harvest rate. Overall, while
increasing the diversity in a community (relative
to the profit maximizing level) has a cost, the cost
of using marine reserves to do so—which
provides a degree of guaranteed diversity even
if over-harvested—is relatively cheap. These
patterns are consistent for other parameter
values.
FACILITATION MODEL
Real communities are more complicated than
our null model: species interact, have different
life-history traits, and are differentially valuable
when harvested. In this section we present a
model in which interspecies interactions are
strong, as a contrast to the null model.
As in the null model, species accumulate in a
patch as they colonize, but in this ‘‘facilitation’’
model, species colonize in sequential order, (i.e.,
species 2 cannot colonize unless species 1 is
present, and species 3 cannot colonize without
species 2, etc.). Once a species has colonized, it
does not displace the previous inhabitants, so a
patch with species 5 necessarily will contain
species 1 through 4 as well. Uninhabitable
patches, which are created by harvest, must
recover from this disturbance before they can be
colonized by the first species.
Because of this strong facilitative interaction,
the number of states is tremendously reduced
compared to the null model with the same
number of species. One can now specify the
state of a patch with a scalar quantity indicating
the number of species in a patch. We call the
proportion of patches in state i, xi. As before, we
write a system of differential equations to track
how colonization, harvest, and recovery change
the proportion of patches in these states. (For
parameters and variables, see Table 3.)
We again imagine N patches inhabited by S
species. x/ indicates the fraction of patches that
are uninhabitable. These are created through
harvest (at rate h) and recover at rate r:
dx/
dt
¼ h
Xn
i¼0
xi
 !
 rx/: ð25Þ
Let us focus on patches in state i. The
proportion of such patches changes when prop-
agules from species i colonize state i 1 patches,
propagules from species i þ 1 colonize state i
patches, or state i patches are harvested and
Fig. 6. The cost, in forgone profit, necessary to achieve different levels of protected diversity and diversity gain
for a 15-species version of the null model (Eqs. 18 and 19) and facilitation model (Eqs. 25–28) with parameter
values c¼ 5, r¼1, w¼ 0.5 and e¼ 1. Since a diversity is positive at h¼hPM, the diversity gain does not extend to S
¼15. The white line shows the profit-maximizing diversity gain for each level of protected diversity. Points below
this line are sub-optimal in both diversity and profit.
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rendered uninhabitable. Colonization by species i
occurs via propagules which are produced at a
per patch rate of ci. Combining these, we obtain
(cf. Fig. 7)
dx0
dt
¼ rx/  c1x0
XS
i¼1
xi
 !
 hx0; ð26Þ
dxi
dt
¼ ciþ1xi
XS
j¼iþ1
xj
 !
þ cixi1
XS
j¼i
xj
 !
 hxi;
ð27Þ
dxS
dt
¼ cSxSxS1  hxS: ð28Þ
Facilitation model: equilibria
As in the null model, while individual patches
continue to change state, the proportions of
patches in different states equilibrate. These
equilibria are straightforward to calculate for
arbitrary parameter values (Appendix C). Here
we focus on the case when the propagule
production rate is equal among species (i.e., ci ¼
c for all i ). We illustrate this case for comparison
with the null model.
For the model given by Eqs. 25–28, the number
of species that can persist is given by
S ¼ min S; cr
hðr þ hÞ
  
ð29Þ
where b c indicates the floor function.
If the harvest rate is high relative to the
propagule production and recovery rates, all S
species cannot coexist in the community at
equilibrium. Thus, species 1 through S* occupy
positive proportions of the habitat, while species
above S* are absent. The stable solution when S*
is positive (Appendix C) is
x/ ¼
h
r þ h ; ð30Þ
xi ¼
h
c
; for i ¼ 0; . . . ; S  1; ð31Þ
x
S ¼
r
r þ h
Sh
c
; and ð32Þ
xj ¼ 0; for j. S: ð33Þ
Table 3. Facilitation model parameters and variables.
Term Units Definition
r time1 rate of recovery for uninhabitable patches
to become habitable
c time1 rate of propagule production from a
single patch
w $ patch1 cost of effort
e . . . efficiency of harvest
N no. number of patches in the community
S no. spp. number of species in the community
h time1 rate of harvest; this renders the harvested
patch uninhabitable
x/ . . . proportion of patches in the
uninhabitable state
xi . . . proportion of patches with species 1
through i
xf . . . proportion of patches in reserve, with all
S species present
qj $ the value of species j
j . . . constant that relates the value of patches
in state j  1 to those in state j
Note: An ellipsis indicates a unitless quantity.
Fig. 7. Schematic of facilitation model (Eqs. 25–28) states (boxes), transitions (arrows), and rates (arrow labels).
As in the null model, patches can transition from being uninhabitable to habitable and empty at rate r, but
subsequent colonization can only be initiated by species 1. Those patches may then be colonized by species 2, etc.
at rates that are proportional to the propagule production rate c, the number of patches able to be colonized, and
the number of patches producing colonizing propagules. All patches may be harvested at rate h.
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The proportion of patches in the uninhabitable
state is the same as in the null model. In the null
model, all species are extirpated when h(rþ h)/r .
c. In contrast, in the facilitation model, species are
sequentially extirpated from the community as
harvest rate increases from zero, with the late
colonizers being the most vulnerable to overfish-
ing (Appendix D: Fig. D2). The earliest colonizer
(species 1), which is the most resilient in the face of
harvesting, is eliminated at the same harvest rate
that would eliminate all species in the null model.
Facilitation model: diversity and profit
Using Eqs. 30–33, we can calculate equilibrium
diversity and profit. The expected number of
species in a patch, or a diversity is
a ¼
XS
i¼1
ixi; ð34Þ
¼ r
r þ h
hðS þ 1Þ
2c
 
S; ð35Þ
since a patch in state ihas i species present and ci¼c.
Diversity declines monotonically with harvest
in the facilitation model, but more precipitously
at low harvest levels than in the null model (Fig.
3a). Diversity vanishes (i.e., all species are
extirpated) at the same harvest rate for both
types of communities.
In the facilitation model, species are not
identical. It is reasonable then to allow different
species to have different economic value. Let qj
be the value of species j. A simple model for
species values is the geometric series:
qj ¼ q1jj1: ð36Þ
If the constant j is less than 1, early colonizing
species are worth more than later colonizers; j .
1 indicates the opposite. We use q1 ¼ 1, and j ¼
0.9, 1, and 1.1 to explore different value
relationships.
The value of a patch in state i is then
pi ¼
Xi
j¼1
qj; ð37Þ
and the total harvest value is
p ¼ h e
XS
i¼1
xipi
 !
 w
" #
: ð38Þ
As in the null model, profit is maximized at an
intermediate harvest rate (Appendix D: Fig. D3).
At open-access, profit is zero and the harvest rate
is higher. As might be expected, profits are larger,
and profit-maximizing harvest rates are smaller,
if later colonizing species are more valuable
relative to early colonizers (i.e., for larger j).
Profit is maximized at lower harvest rates than in
the null model (compare Appendix D: Fig. D3
with Fig. 3b). At sufficiently high harvest levels,
when only early colonizing species persist, the
profit is essentially independent of j.
We can now compare the diversity and profit
among fisheries with different biological or
economic parameterizations (Fig. 8). Diversity is
again maximized at a¼ S when h¼ 0 and p¼ 0.
Fig. 8b shows the potential profit that is lost by
maximizing diversity. Fig. 8c shows the diversity
that is gained by not harvesting, relative to
harvesting to maximize profit; this is the differ-
ence between maximum diversity, S, and the
diversity at the profit maximizing-harvest level.
Below, we highlight several qualitative patterns
in the trade-off between diversity and profit.
First note that low harvest costs (w) and high
propagule production rates (c) increase profits. In
such profitable systems, the trade-off between
diversity and profit is relatively large; however,
as later colonizers become more valuable (higher
j), the trade-off between diversity and profit is
diminished. In contrast, communities with high
effort costs and low propagule production rates
do not tend to have a large trade-off, as both the
profit loss and diversity gain are low.
One interesting case to consider is a low j
community (first column of Fig. 8) with low w
and low c. While the monetary loss from
maximizing diversity is low, the diversity gain
is still high. In this case, even though the profit
maximizing harvest level is low (and thus profits
are low), diversity declines even more rapidly (as
the community re-builds species slowly), making
the profit maximizing diversity level low. As j
increases, and the trade-off between diversity
and profit decreases, this low w, low c region
ceases to have such high diversity costs.
Facilitation model: spatial management
Let xf be the proportion of patches that are
designated as a reserve. These patches cannot be
fished and we assume they are in the unharvest-
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ed equilibrium state with all species present. We
modify Eqs. 25–28 to obtain a set of S þ 2
differential equations that describe the dynamics
of a facilitation system with reserves:
dx/
dt
¼ hð1 x/  xf Þ  rx/; ð39Þ
dx0
dt
¼ rx/  c1x0
XS
j¼1
xj
 !
 hx0; ð40Þ
dxi
dt
¼ ciþ1xi xf þ
XS
j¼iþ1
xj
 !
þ cixi1 xf þ
XS
j¼i
xj
 !
 hxi; ð41Þ
dxS
dt
¼ cSðxf þ xSÞxS1  hxS: ð42Þ
Using a modification of Eq. 35 to calculate
diversity:
a ¼ Sxf þ
XS
i
ixi ð43Þ
and Eq. 38 along with the (numerically derived)
equilibria of this system, we can calculate
diversity and profit for communities with and
without reserves (Fig. 5).
As in the null model, diversity is always higher
in communities with reserves, and at high
harvest levels the diversity is almost entirely
within the reserves. The implementation of
reserves reduces the maximum profit rate (Fig.
5), but higher harvest levels can still be profit-
able. In these instances, the open-access harvest
rate is larger.
We again calculate the ‘protected diversity,’
Fig. 8. (a) a versus p for a 15-species version of the facilitation model (Eqs. 25–28), with w¼0.05, r¼1, e¼1, and
c ¼ 5. Price per patch was determined by j, as marked. (b) Potential profit lost from harvesting at the diversity
maximizing level (h¼ 0). (c) The diversity gain from no harvest relative to harvesting at the profit maximizing
level (h ¼ hPM). For all panels, S ¼ 15, r ¼ 1, q1 ¼ 1, and e ¼ 1.
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‘forgone profit,’ and ‘diversity gain’ for all
combinations of harvest rates and reserve frac-
tions. These quantities are calculated in the same
way as in the null model and are shown
schematically in Fig. 1b. The cost in forgone
profit of different levels of protected diversity
and diversity gain is shown in Fig. 5.
Qualitatively, the trade-offs among cost and
the two diversity metrics are the same as in the
null model, although the maximum foregone
profit and maximum diversity gains are lower in
the facilitation model. For a given reserve
fraction, the protected diversity is the same
between the two models. The cost of adding
protected diversity to a given level of diversity
gain is still minimal and is generally cheaper than
in the null model.
DISCUSSION
The coupled metacommunity-economic mod-
eling framework we have described provides a
way to examine the ecological and economic
factors that influence profit-diversity trade-offs.
The quantities we highlighted—foregone profit,
diversity gain, and protected diversity—are
useful for structuring thinking about the trade-
offs in a complex bioeconomic system (Fig. 1).
Our framework is, perhaps, best suited for
identifying the types of harvested communities
that are cost-effective to manage. For example,
our analysis showed that in communities struc-
tured by facilitative colonization dynamics, a
manager could often increase diversity without
sacrificing much profit from reduced harvest,
especially when propagule production rates and
harvest costs are low.
An advantage of the framework is that it
permits inclusion of a variety of ecological rates
and types of interactions. This is important,
because such variation exists in real marine
systems. For example, strongly competitive
systems that exhibit trophic cascades have been
observed (Casini et al. 2008), while other systems
show strong facilitative interactions (Silliman et
al. 2011). These communities may change at
vastly different rates. Recovery from harvest
disturbance may take a long time—hundreds of
years for deep water corals, which grow on the
order of a few millimeters per year (Lartaud et al.
2013)—or a short time—for habitats which are
not damaged by fishing, such as long-line fished
systems or those with muddy substrates. Addi-
tionally, colonization rates can vary widely in
marine metacommunities and may depend upon
oceanographic features, the distribution of hab-
itat, and species’ attributes. Strategic models of
the kind we developed here can accommodate
this ecological variability and complement the
system-specific analyses that model the interac-
tions and management of a particular communi-
ty (e.g., Rassweiler et al. 2012).
In our analysis, we compared a null commu-
nity with no interactions to one with strong,
facilitative colonizing interactions. The facilita-
tive interaction results in a community that is
more sensitive to harvest; it loses species sequen-
tially as harvest rates increase. In contrast, all
species persist in the null model until the harvest
rate exceeds a threshold value. Facilitative
community assembly also reduces profits and
profit-maximizing harvest rates. Both the magni-
tude and shape of the profit-diversity trade-off
are changed by the type of ecological interaction
(Figs. 4 and 8). Decreasing propagule production
rates or colonization rates affect the diversity-
profit trade-off in similar ways in both the null
and facilitation models; the magnitude of the
trade-off is changed, but not the shape.
The reader should not expect that the relation-
ship between profit and diversity will always be
as simple as the curves depicted in Figs. 1, 3c,
and 8a; other types of ecological interactions will
produce even more interesting, complicated
trade-offs. For example, in a competitive meta-
community where species displace each other at
a patch (modeled by Hastings 1980), there is a
non-monotonic relationship between the harvest
rate and the number of species that persist. Our
preliminary analysis of optimal harvest in this
type of community suggests that the relationship
between diversity and profit is more complex. In
addition, other measures of diversity (e.g., beta-
diversity or species richness) may be better suited
to capturing these trade-offs.
The models we formulated can include poten-
tially large numbers of species. The extensive
literature on two species metacommunities has
illustrated how important interspecies interac-
tions are for species persistence and diversity
patterns (e.g., Caswell and Cohen 1991, Nee and
May 1992, Klausmeier 2001, Prakash and de Roos
v www.esajournals.org 15 November 2015 v Volume 6(11) v Article 246
MOBERG ET AL.
2004, Gouhier et al. 2011). When these models are
extended to include marine reserves, species
interactions may change the optimal reserve size
and configuration (Baskett 2007, Baskett et al.
2007). We extended these results by showing that
such interactions continue to be important in
much larger communities. Our results comport
with those of Matsuda and Abrams (2006) who
studied yield in multispecies fisheries and found,
as we did, that few species are driven to
extinction at yield (or in our case, profit)
maximizing harvest levels. In addition, the
authors found that constraining the harvest to
prevent species extinction could be done without
substantially reducing yield, which is analogous
to our result for the cost of protected diversity.
We also investigated the cost of using marine
reserves as a diversity-preserving management
technique. In particular, we highlighted differ-
ences in the diversity gains achieved when the
harvest rate maximizes profit or dissipates it at
open access. For both the null and facilitation
models, we found that that the cost of achieving
some protected diversity tends to be low. At least
for the theoretical communities we studied,
marine reserves are an efficient way to prevent
the erosion of diversity at high harvest levels.
In contrast with some previous results, we
found that marine reserves are not economically
optimal in this model (i.e., reserves never
increase the maximum profit attainable). Differ-
ent per patch pricing methods that we examined
did not reverse this result. Other, single-species
models (e.g., Neubert 2003, Sanchirico et al. 2006,
Neubert and Herrera 2008, White et al. 2008,
Moeller and Neubert 2013) have found reserves
to be economically optimal; these models incor-
porate spatial heterogeneity, which our models
do not.
Our models also neglect natural disturbance.
Thus, the inclusion of marine reserves here
shows the maximum diversity benefit of re-
serves, as reserves have all species present.
Natural disturbance primarily affects the role of
marine reserves (in the non-reserve section, a
disturbance rate that reduces all patches to being
uninhabitable is additive with harvest and can be
easily separated), as an additional Sþ2 equations
to track the natural destruction and re-building
of non-fished patches would be required. The
magnitude of natural disturbance relative to the
colonization, harvest, and recovery rates will
determine whether natural disturbance is critical
to the trade-offs we described here.
We assume that harvesters do not know the
state of a particular patch, but rather only know
the mean conditions of the entire metacommun-
ity. They are additionally harvesting all fish
present at a patch. In reality, harvesters with
modern technology are increasingly able to target
specific species of fish at specific locations.
Allowing fishermen to target either species
(species-specific harvest rates) or areas in space
would dramatically increase the number of states
and/or controls. This would certainly make
harvesters more economically efficient and likely
qualitatively change the shape of the trade-off
between profit and diversity.
This framework allowed us to investigate
broad scale patterns of diversity-profit trade-offs
and identify regions where conservation would
be cost-effective. We believe there are many
interesting directions to extend this work. For
example, our model is spatially implicit and does
not allow us to investigate spatial patterns in
connectivity (for colonization) or in harvest (such
as ‘fishing the line around marine reserves’). The
inclusion of spatial complexity allows for spatial
variation in harvest, which can result in non-
intuitive configurations of harvesting effort (Wi-
len et al. 2002, Neubert 2003, Kellner et al. 2007,
Costello and Polasky 2008). These analyses show
that complicated patterns that are not intuitively
obvious may appear when harvester behavior in
space is accounted for. Spatial variation in
harvest may mitigate the trade-off between
harvest and biodiversity objectives.
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